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MINORITY ELDERS: VICTIMS OF DOUBLE
DISCRIMINATION IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
BENEFIT PLANS
Michael Gilfix *
By virtue of their race as well as their age, minority elders face
unique legal problems. One of the worst of these is the inequitable
treatment afforded minority elders under various types of financial
benefit plans. In this Article, the author explores the causes of the
disproportionate distribution of benefits and suggests several legal
bases on which to challenge such plans as well as several remedial
steps which might equalize their impact.
Discrimination against the elderly 1 has been and remains an unfor-
tunate and omnipresent element of American society. 2 Equally
unfortunate and persistent is the racism that continues in the
United States. While each has been the subject of legislation, 3 litiga-
tion, 4 and/or constitutional amendment, 5 virtually no concerted atten-
tion has been directed to legal problems of minority elders as they
differ-in nature or degree-from legal problems of elders gener-
ally. 6 Nor has the problem of effectively delivering legal services to
minority elders been viewed as one justifying attention. 7
• Director of Senior Adults Legal Assistance in Palo Alto, California; J. D., Stanford Univer-
sity. Mr. Gilfix has been a lecturer at the Stanford Law School, and is a member of the Califor-
nia Bar.
Mr. Gilfix wishes to express his appreciation for the assistance given him in the preparation
of this article by Abe Mora, his research assistant, and by Dr. Fernando Torres-Gil, Myra
Gerson Gilfix, Esq., Jennifer Jensen, and Eleanor "Perky" Perkins.
1. The term "elders"-like "senior citizens," "senior adults," "older persons," "mature
adults"-most often refers to persons who are 60 years of age or older. In this Article, however,
the term is also descriptive of members of minority groups who are, relative to other members
of that minority, older. Hence, a 50 year old Indian person is an elder if, for example, life
expectancy for Indian persons is 55 years of age.
2. See 1 WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE ON AGING (1961); 1, 2 WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE
ON AGING (1971-1972).
3. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2000e-15 (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2000e-17 (Supp. IV, 1974); Older Americans Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 3001 (1970); Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1970).
4. See, e.g., Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976); Brown v.
Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, XIV, XV.
6. Minority elders face many special legal problems that will not be treated in this Article.
For example, Indians have estate planning needs which are common to no other group. They
must avoid fractionalization of lands in order to protect tribal ownership.
Particularly in California, there are many older Indians who have ownership interests, but
because they are indigent and often ignorant of their rights, these elder Indians to not take
steps to control the devise of their property interests upon their deaths. As a result, their lands
pass by the laws of intestacy and are likely to be left to blood descendants who do not live on
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This Article will focus on the inequitable treatment afforded mi-
nority elders under financial benefit plans such as Social Security, 8
Medicare, 9 and private pension plans. While these plans are scrupu-
lously non-discriminatory on their face, they are not racially neutral
in operation and impact. Numerous causative factors will be ad-
dressed, and several legal theories on which to base a challenge to
the discriminatory results of such plans will be suggested. In so
doing, the need for revision of certain statutory provisions will be-
come clear, as will the need for the delivery of culturally attuned
legal services.
DEFINITION OF THE PROBLEM
For a variety of economic, social and historical reasons, minority
elders are more likely than other elders to require the benefits of
public and private retirement and income maintenance programs. Yet
minorities are far less likely to qualify for benefits because their
the tribal land. Notwithstanding their Indian blood, these persons may be insensitive to their
Indian heritage and may take no steps to insure ultimate tribal ownership.
Currently, legal services programs for elder Indians lack the necessary resources to seek out
those with ownership interests and are not equipped to address this estate planning need. If the
need is not addressed, a threatened culture will be deprived of the one resource that may be
the key to its survival: land.
See CALIFORNIA INDIAN LEGAL SERVICES OF OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA, ESTATE PLANNING
PROJECT FOR OLDER CALIFORNIA INDIANS (1976).
7. Philosophy Professor Jeffrie G. Murphy states in his review of S. DE BEAUVOIR, THE
COMING OF ACE (1972), that despite the well-publicized plight of elders, "'their disadvantaged
state is tolerated by society at large with a degree of indifference and. callousness that is morally
indecent." 17 ARIZ. L. REV. 546 (1975). See generally, Gilfix, Meeting the Legal Needs of
Elders, 2 NEW DIRECTIONS IN LEGAL SERVICES 68 (1977).
8. The Social Security system is governed by the Social Security Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§
402-432 (1970). Under this system, workers in all but a few exempt occupations pay 5.85% of
their salary, up to an income of $16,500 per year, to the Social Security system. This money is
placed by the government into two statutorily created trust funds, one for retirement and one
for disability benefits. It is this payment of funds during the working years that makes a worker
eligible for a retirement income once he or she reaches age 65. One may opt to retire at age 62,
but not without suffering a substantial loss of benefits. The amount of income a retired worker
receives is based on a formula depending largely on how much money the worker paid into the
system during his working years. Social Security is the primary source of retirement income for
approximately 90% of the population that is 65 or older.
For a summary of major Social Security benefits and provisions, see M. Gilfix & Wellbery,
Social Security: An Overview & Description (1976) (available from Senior Adults Legal Assis-
tance, Palo Alto, California). See also U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE,
BLACKS AND SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS: TRENDS 1960-1973, PUB. No. (SSA) 11700 (1975).
9. Medicare is available to persons 65 and over in two forms. Part A is automatically avail-
able if such persons are entitled to either Social Security or railroad retirement benefits. 42
U.S.C. §§ 1395c-1395i(2) (1970) as amended, (Supp. lII 1973). Disabled persons who are
under age 65 can also obtain Medicare coverage. 42 U.S.C. § 1395(c)(2) (Supp. III 1973). Part B
is available at a monthly fee for persons 65 and over who do not qualify for Part A. 42 U.S.C. §
1395i-(2) (Supp. III 1973).
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average life expectancy is too short or because, for cultural, educa-
tional, or other reasons, they fail to apply.
Available s.tatistics indicate that minority elders suffer far more
poverty than their white age peers.10  The following table illustrates
the difference in economic position between black and white elders in
1973.11
Percentage Below
Age, Race & Status Poverty Line
65+, white, head of household 8.4
65+, black, head of household 31.4
65+, white, unrelated individual 29.6
65+, black, unrelated individual 59.2
The data above, however, understate the severity of the problem.
First, the table is based on an artificially low definition of poverty 12
and excludes a great many elders who face actual poverty, not-
withstanding government guidelines. A more accurate estimate of
how many elders face economic hardship can be gained by noting the
number of "near poor" as well as "poor." 13
Percentage Below
Age, Race & Status Near Poor Poverty Line
65+, white, head of household 15.3
65+, black, head of household 47.8
65+, white, unrelated individual 47.1
65+, black, unrelated individual 75.1
Secondly, the table fails to reflect the fact that minorities are not a
part of the so-called nouveau pauvre or "new poor."1 4 This phrase
10. Much of the analysis of minority problems is focused on blacks because they comprise
over 90% of the minority population in the United States and more comparative data are availa-
ble for them. Similarly, limitations in available data will sometimes require a focus on Black and
Anglo males to the exclusion of females. Accordingly, care should be taken in applying the
statistical information and conclusions to other minority population segments.
11. ADMINISTRATION ON AGING, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, FACTS
& FIGURES ON OLDER AMERICANS, No. 11, INCOME AND POVERTY IN 1973, at 11 (1975).
12. The average poverty line for an older unrelated individual in 1973 was $2,119. It was
$2,662 for a two-person older family. Id. at 3.
13. Id. at 12. "Near poor" is defined as having an annual income that is less than 125% of
the poverty line. Id. at 3.
The situation was not much better for the elderly Spanish-speaking. A 1960 study of elderly
Spanish surnamed persons in a California urban setting found their median income to be $1,616
as compared with $2,140 for elderly Anglos. Moore, Mexican Americans, THE GERONTOLOGIST
31 (Spring, 1971).
14. Alexander, Foreward: Life, Liberty and Property Rights for the Elderly, 17 ARIz. L.
REV. 267, 268 (1975).
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describes an older working person who is suddenly deprived of a job
and status in life. Although applicable to a large number of white
males, it rarely holds true for the elder who also happens to be black,
Spanish-speaking, 15 Indian or Asian-American. 16  The unfortunate
fact is that most older minority persons have always been poor or, at
least, experience a far less drastic change in income level upon
reaching elder status than do their white counterparts. 17
As one would expect, the higher incidence of poverty among mi-
nority groups is reflected in life expectancy differentials. The follow-
ing table sets forth life expectancy figures by both color and sex for
years ranging from 1900 to 1973.18
White All other
Total Male Female Male Female
Life expectancy
at birth:
1973 ................................. 71.3 68.4 76.1 61.9 70.1
1972 ................................. 71.1 68.3 75.9 61.5 69.9
1970 ................................. 70.9 68.0 75.6 61.3 69.4
1960 ................................. 69.7 67.4 74.1 61.1 66.3
1900 ................................. 47.3 46.6 48.7 32.5 33.5
at age 20:
1973 ................................. 53.4 50.5 57.7 44.9 52.6
1900-1902 .......................... - 42 2 43.8 35.1 38.9
Percent reaching age
65:
1973 ................................. 72.9 67.5 82.2 51.0 68.1
1900-1902 .......................... - 39.2 43.8 19.0 22.0
The relatively vast differences in life expectancy between whites
and non-whites 19 have far-reaching implications in the context of
15. Spanish-speaking includes Mexican-Americans, Puerto Ricans, Cubans, and Latin
Americans.
16. Asian-American includes Chinese, Japanese and Samoan.
17. ADMINISTRATION ON AGING, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE,
FACTS AND FIGURES ON OLDER AMERICANS, No. 8, POVERTY bY STATE AND ETHNIC
GRouP-1969, at 3 (1973).
18. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, 2 VITAL STATISTICS OF THE U.S.
§ 5 Table 5-B (1975).
19. Dr. Robert N. Butler, Director of the National Institute on Aging, indicates the follow-
ing life expectancy figures for American males in the period from 1900 to 1968:
White 67.5 years
Black 60.0 years (in 1968)
Mexican-American 57.0 years
American Indian 44.0 years
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benefit plans that have inflexible age eligibility requirements. 20  For
example, consider two men in the context of a retirement plan that
establishes the normal retirement age at sixty-five. One is white and
one is black. Both are age twenty, work at the same job for the same
rate of pay, and decide to stay with their employer and retire at age
sixty-five with full retirement benefits. 21 The white laborer, with a
remaining life expectancy of 50.5 years, will likely receive monthly
retirement checks for five and one half years, a period in which he
would collect $33,000 if benefits are $500 per month. Because the
remaining life expectancy of a twenty year old black male is only 44.9
years, it is more likely than not that the black worker will not survive
He also states the surprising fact that in the period from 1900 to 1968 the average life expec-
tancy of Black males declined by one year. R. BUTLER, WHY SURVIVE? 6 (1975)
20. Another way of looking at the problem is to examine the mortality or death rates of
white and minority persons.
Death Rates per 1,000 in 1972
Men Women
Black & Black &
AGE white other white other
15-24 1.7 3.0 0.6 1.2
25-34 1.8 5.4 0.8 2.1
35-44 3.2 9.2 1.8 4.5
45-54 8.7 16.7 4.4 9.6
55-64 21.3 31.8 9.9 18.4
65-74 48.1 54.0 24.4 34.9
75-84 101.7 89.9 65.2 64.2
85 and older 184.2 119.0 157.3 103.3
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, BLACKS AND SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS:
TRENDS 1960-1973, at 5, PUB. No. (SSA) 11700 (1975).
The table reveals that minority groups experience markedly higher mortality rates in all age
categories until age 75. The differences are particularly pronounced in the 45-54 and 55-64
categories. These data are entirely consistent with the life expectancy tables and'shows propor-
tionally, that many more minority persons die before reaching 65 years of age than do Anglos.
21. Note that a person may opt for the receipt of retirement benefits at age 62, but the
monthly payments are lower than if the person waits until age 65 to receive them. Although a
widow can receive the same monthly benefits her husband was receiving if she is 60 years old
and satisfies other requirements, this factor does not affect the main point in any appreciable
way. 42 U.S.C. § 402(e) (1970); 20 C.F.R. § 404 (1977).
The choice of age 65 as America's retirement age has an interesting, if somewhat elusive,
history. In the Social Security Act, 65 was adopted as the eligibility age for retirement benefits
virtually without debate. The designation of age 65 as the appropriate retirement age apparently
dates back to Otto von Bismarck who, in 1868, instituted the world's first old age pension in
Germany. See S. DE BEAUVOIR, THE COMING OF AGE (1972). It can well be pondered how
many of Bismarck's fellow Germans survived until age 65 in the nineteenth century. America's
choice of this age demarcation can be viewed as an act of benign ignorance. The failure to make
appropriate adjustments cannot be so beneficently considered.
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to receive any benefits whatsoever. Through his contributions to the
company retirement fund, he has borne the burden of supporting a
fund that is disproportionately and substantially benefiting white re-
tirees to the detriment of black retirees. The result is an unconscion-
able and ultimately racist approach to the support of our nation's el-
ders.
Surviving to age sixty-five, however, satisfies but one element
necessary for the receipt of equal benefits by minority persons. Still
other is*sues are raised when the over-sixty-five population is consid-
ered, since the most significant racial difference in the receipt of
cash benefits is found among the sixty-five and older age group. 22 A
primary reason for this disparity is that large numbers of minority
persons work in occupations that simply are not covered by the Social
Security system. Most notable 'are domestic workers and farm labor-
ers, who were not brought under the Social Security Act until
amendments were passed in 1950 and 1954, respectively. 23 These
amendments offer little solace to the countless minority persons who
today receive no retirement benefits because they were too old to
take advantage of the 1950 and 1954 amendments. 24  Moreover,
many minority persons work in other fields still not covered by the
Social Security Act. 25
Many minority elders qualify for social security, but at a much
lower rate than elder white jroups.2 6 There are several reasons for
this discrepancy. Most obviously, minority elders receive lower ben-
efits because they earn less money in their qualifying quarters. As
victims of racial discrimination, minority workers have been denied
training and promotion opportunities and tend to be demoted or dis-
charged more quickly than whites. 27 This compels earlier retirement
and more sick leave and interferes with the ability to obtain and pre-
serve employment. Earnings as a class are also low because minority
22. In 1973, for example, 92% of whites in this age group were receiving cash benefits, as
compared to 80% of blacks. L. RUBIN, Economic Status of Black Persons: Finding from the
Survey of Newly Entitled Beneficiaries, SOCIAL SECURITY BULLETIN 2 (Sept. 1974).
23. See 42 U.S.C. § 410j)(3)(C) and 410(0 (1970).
24. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, BLACKS AND SOCIAL SECURITY
BENEFITS: TRENDS 1960-1973, at 2 (1975).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 410 (1970).
26. In 1973, for example, retired white males received average Social Security checks in the
amount of $185.60 while black retired males received an average of $149.70 per month. DIVI-
SION OF OASDHI STATISTICS, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, SOCIAL SECURITY BEN-
EFITS & EARNINGS OF MINORITY GROUPS IN COVERED EMPLOYMENT (1973).
27. See note 24 supra.
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persons, particularly Mexican-Americans, historically have engaged in
a great deal of seasonal and casual employment.2 8
Many minority elders are simply ignorant of their rights under the
various benefit plans: They tend to be poorer and less educated than
white elders and, therefore, less eager to expose themselves to gov-
ernment bureaucracies and a judicial system that demands sophisti-
cated advocacy. These limitations are compounded by language and
cultural barriers each of which can create problems at every stage in
the process of obtaining benefits.2 9  Many offices simply lack bilin-
gual and bicultural personnel who can respond to the needs of such
elders. At the same time, the unsophisticated minority elder is most
susceptible to consumer fraud and most likely to accept without
challenge the unfavorable decisions of such bodies as the Social Se-
curity Administration.
28. Employers often fail to report such employment for Social Security purposes, thereby
saving substantial sums of money in withheld contributions. F. Torres-Gil, Los Anuanos De La
Raza, A Beginning Framework for Research, Analysis, and Policy 46 (May, 1972) (unpublished,
Brandeis University Florence Hiller Graduate School for Advanced Studies in Social Welfare).
29. Consider the plight of the Spanish-speaking elder who does not speak English and who
is desirous of applying for Supplemental Security Income. Assuming that s/he qualifies, s/he
may have to overcome a series of hurdles to obtain his/her benefits.
Step 1: Application at Social Security Office.
Barriers: language and culture, inertia, ignorance of SSI, transportation, delay,
pride, legality of residence.
Step 2: Proof of Age.
Barriers: born in Mexico, language, culture, legality of residence, illiterate.
Step 3: Notification of Determination of Eligibility-Denial.
Barriers: language, illiteracy, ambiguous content of determination, lack of legal
assistance.
Step 4: Contact SSA.
Barriers: language, uncertain of reason, individual vs. bureaucracy, SSA does not
have a copy of the determination letter-must go to SSA.
Step 5: Visit SSA re Denial.
Barriers: language, culture, transportation, delay, refusal of SSA worker to accept
responsibility.
Step 6: Request Redetermination.
Barriers: language, lack of legal assistance, ignorance of standards, delay.
Step 7: Redetermination Denied-Request Hearing.
Barriers: language, lack of legal assistance, ignorance of standard and inaccessi-
bility of information, delay.
Step 8: Hearing.
Barriers: language, culture, lack of legal assistance, transportation.
The elder Spanish-speaking may thus be compelled to combat a system that only the more
resolute of Anglos will confront and challenge. Unless bilingual and bicultural workers are avail-
able at every stage, and unless transportation and legal assistance is actually available, the
"right" to Supplemental Security Income benefits becomes an illusory one.
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Illegal aliens -typically Mexican-Americans -often actively avoid
any government contact for fear of deportation and so may never
apply for public benefits of any kind. The same is true of persons
uncertain of the legality of their status even if they have worked in
this country for twenty or thirty years. 30
A similar problem exists in the Asian-American elder community,
whose members suffer a unique handicap under the Social Security
system. Many have been deprived of eligibility or receive lower ben-
efits because of their involuntary and enforced internment in prison
camps during World War II.31 This government action is now com-
monly condemned. The suggestion that all persons who were incar-
cerated in the camps receive credit under Social Security and all
other federal benefit programs is therefore a modest remedial action
that should be taken.3 2
LEGAL BASES FOR CHALLENGES TO DISCRIMINATORY
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RETIREMENT BENEFIT PLANS
A number of legal theories may be employed to challenge dis-
criminatory aspects of Social Security, other governmental programs,
and private pension plans. The most promising approaches derive
from the constitutional guarantee of equal protection, statutory pro-
tections of civil rights and fair representation by unions.
Equal Protection
Federal benefit plans, including primarily the Social Security sys-
tem, are susceptible to attack under the United States Constitution as
a violation of equal protection. While the Fourteenth Amendment
contains the Equal Protection Clause that applies to state action, the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment includes an equal pro-
30. The extent of this problem was revealed in a 1971 study of Mexican-American elders by
Dr. Torres-Gil. Drawing from a sample population in a Los Angeles Barrio, he found that 38%
of his subjects were not United States citizens. Without exception, the persons who were not
citizens had been in the United States a minimum of 15 years. Reasons they had not applied for
citizenship reflected their self-perceptions of powerlessness in American society. Many were
illiterate, could not speak English and were simply unaware of how to apply for citizenship. F.
Torres-Gil, supra note 28, at 165-66.
31. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). In Korematsu, the Supreme Court
held that the mass imprisonment of Japanese-Americans during World War II was justified on
grounds of national security.
32. 1971 WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE ON AGING, ADMINISTRATION ON ACING, U.S. DEP'T




tection element that provides similar constraints on actions of the
federal government. 33
Federal courts have been presented with many equal protection
challenges to employment practices which neutral on their face
have produced a racially disproportionate impact. 34 Nearly every
court found statistical proof of the discriminatory impact of a particu-
lar employment practice sufficient to establish a prima facie case of an
equal protection violation.3 5 The defendant employer was then re-
quired to prove that the rule or practice bore a demonstrable re-
lationship to successful performance on the job. 36 If defendants
failed to show job-relatedness to the satisfaction of the court, the
plaintiffs prevailed on the basis of the discriminatory impact alone,3 7
regardless of any good faith intentions on the part of the employer. 38
However, if such job-relatedness were demonstrated, the rule or
practice was sustained despite its disproportionate impact. 39 These
courts recognized the obvious difficulties inherent in proving subjec-
tive intent as well as the fact that arbitrary or even innocent policy
decisions by employers can have unacceptable discriminatory results.
33. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).
34. Douglas v. Hampton, 512 F.2d 976 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v.
Bridgeport Civil Serv. Comm'n, 482 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1973); Castro v. Beecher, 459 F..2d 725
(1st Cir. 1972); Chance v. Board of Examiners, 458 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1972); Arnold v. Ballard,
390 F. Supp. 723 (N.D. Ohio 1975); United States v. City of Chicago, 385 F. Supp. 543 (N.D.
I11. 1974); Wade v. Mississippi Cooperative Extension Serv., 372 F. Supp. 126 (N.D. Miss.
1974); Harper v. Mayor of Baltimore, 359 F. Supp. 1187 (D. Md. 1973), aff 'd in pertinent part
sub nom., Harper v. Kloster, 486 F.2d 1134 (4th Cir. 1973); Fowler v. Schwarzwalder, 351 F.
Supp. 721 (1). Minn. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 498 F.2d 143 (8th Cir. 1974).
35. Note, Discriminatory Purpose: What It Means under the Equal Protection Clause-
Washington v. Davis, 26 DEPAUL L. REV. 650, 654 n.23 (1977).
36. See Douglas v. Hampton, 512 F.2d 976, 981 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Davis v. Washington, 512
F.2d 956, 960-61 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Bridgeport Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 482 F.2d 1333, 1335, 1337 (2d Cir. 1973); Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725, 732 (1st
Cir. 1972); Chance v. Board of Examiners, 458 F.2d 1167, 1176 (2d Cir. 1972); Arnold v.
Ballard, 390 F. Supp. 723, 736, 737 (N.D. Ohio 1975); United States v. City of Chicago, 385 F.
Supp. 543, 550 (N.D. 11. 1974); Wade v. Mississippi Cooperative Extension Serv., 372 F.
Supp. 126, 140, 142 (N.D. Miss. 1974); Harper v. Mayor of Baltimore, 359 F. Supp. 1187,
1201, 1204-05 (D. Md. 1973); Fowler v. Schwarzwalder, 351 F. Supp. 721, 724 (D. Minn.
1972).
37. Davis v. Washington, 512 F.2d 956, 961-65 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Bridgeport Guardians,
Inc. v. Bridgeport Civil Serv. Comm'n, 482 F.2d 1333, 1337 (2d Cir. 1973); Castro v. Beecher,
459 F.2d 725, 731 (1st Cir. 1972); Chance v. Board of Examiners, 458 F.2d 1167, 1177 (2d Cir.
1972); United States v. City of Chicago, 385 F. Supp. 543, 561 (N.D. Ill. 1974); Wade v.
Mississippi Cooperative Extension Serv., 372 F. Supp. 126, 143 (N.D. Miss. 1974); Harper v.
Mayor of Baltimore, 359 F. Supp. 1187, 1201 (D. Md. 1973); Fowler v. Schwarzwalder, 351 F.
Supp. 721, 724 (D. Minn. 1972).
38. Davis v. Washington, 512 F.2d 956, 960-61 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
39. Arnold v. Ballard, 390 F. Supp. 723, 733 (N.D. Ohio 1975).
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In the recent case of Washington v. Davis,40 the United States
Supreme Court reversed this seemingly well-established line of au-
thority to the extent that it "rested on or expressed the view that
proof of discriminatory racial purpose is unnecessary in making out an
equal protection violation .. "41 A showing of racially discrimina-
tory impact, however, may still shift the burden of proof so that the
offending entity will be required to show permissible neutral motiva-
tions behind the provision that is being challenged.42 The Court also
acknowledged that:
[n]ecessarily, an invidious discriminatory purpose may often be in-
ferred from the totality of the relevant facts, including the fact, if it
is true, that the law bears more heavily on one race than another.
It is also not infrequently true that the discriminatory impact ...
may . . . demonstrate unconstitutionality because . . . the dis-
crimination is very difficult to explain on non-racial grounds. 43
In short, disparate impact may be a directly relevant factor in deter-
mining purpose. 4
This Article has established that minority persons as a class receive
far less in Social Security benefits than elder white groups. It is not
suggested here that Congress had any racial motives in enacting the
Social Security Act in 1935. Notwithstanding Washington v. Davis,
this does not end the inquiry.
The substantial imbalances in retirement benefits have been known
to the Social Security Administration and to Congress at least since
1975 when the Social Security Administration published an analysis of
benefits as a. function of race. 4 5  In 1971, the Special Needs Session
40. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). Justices Rehnquist, Burger, Blackmun and Powell joined Justice
White in his opinion. Mr. Justice Stewart joined only in the first two of the three sections of the
opinion. Mr. Justice Stevens concurred in the result and expressed disagreement on certain key
points. Justices Brennan and Marshall entered a spirited dissent. For an excellent analysis of
Washington v. Davis and its implications, see Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimi-
nation Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1976). See also Note, Discriminatory Purpose: What It
Means under the Equal Protection Clause-Washington v. Davis, 26 DEPAUL L. REV. 650
(1977).
41. 426 U.S. 245. Note that Mr. justice Stevens, in his concurring opinion, specifically
expressed disagreement with the majority's explicit rejection of the many cases cited in note 34
supra. Id. at 256.
42. Id. at 241, citing Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 632 (1972).
43. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 242.
44. In his concurring opinion, justice Stewart stated: "Frequently the most probative evi-
dence of intent will be objective evidence of what actually happened . . . for normally the actor
is presumed to have intended the natural consequence of his deeds." Id. at 253. He also ex-
pressed concern that a legitimate government action may be invalidated because one of many
legislators expressed an improper motive.
45. See note 24 supra.
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of the White House Conference on Aging called for lowering the
eligibility ages for minority elders for purposes of Social Security re-
tirement benefits. Yet, absolutely no efforts-either administratively
or legislatively -have been undertaken to eliminate or ameliorate a
patently discriminatory system.
When inequitable results of government action have been iden-
tified, there exists a duty to rectify those inequities. Even under
Washington v. Davis, the totality of factual circumstances may estab-
lish a violation of equal protction even though original unlawful
intent may not have existed. In the Social Security context, the cir-
cumstances reflect: (1) the establishment of a system, non-dis-
criminatory on its face, to provide economic support to all persons
who have made a minimum level of contributions to it; (2) disparate
impact, in that minority elders receive far less retirement benefits
than Anglo elders and, in effect, support benefits to Anglos; (3)
knowledge of such disparate impact on the part of the Social Security
Administration and the United States Congress; and (4) refusal by
inaction to rectify major and demonstrable inequities in the system.
Washington casts some doubt on the concept that actors are pre-
sumed to intend the natural results of their actions. However, while
it will excuse disparate impacts where racially neutral motives can be
established, it gives no indication that inequities are to be accepted
and excused forever. In other words, there must come a time when
knowledge plus inaction constitute a discriminatory motivation. 46
When that motivation results in the perpetuation of a discriminatory
system, it should be constitutionally suspect.
Civil Rights Act of 1964
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196441 provides a viable statu-
tory basis for challenging both public and private pension plans. 48 It
46.: An "aflrmative duty" to remedy unlawful discrimination has been held to exist in the
context of formerly de jure segregated school systems. See Green v. County School Board, 391
U.S. 430, 437 (1968). While the existence of a de jure discriminatory system is absent in the
Social Security Act, the principle is precisely the same.
47. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-15 (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (Supp.
IV 1974). An excellent overview of Title VII and its utility is contained in Specter & Spiegel-
man, Employment Discrimination Action Under Federal Civil Rights Acts, 21 AM. JuR. Trials §
1 (1974).
48. Prior to 1972, Title VII contained a clause specifically exempting "theUnited States, a
corporation wholly owned by the Government of the United States . . . , or a State or political
subdivision thereof." Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)(1) (1970). Congress deleted
that government exemption in the Equal Employment Opportunities Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-16 (Supp. IV 1974).
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prohibits an employer from discriminating against any individual with
respect to the conditions of employment on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin. It is well settled that pension and
retirement plans do constitute a condition of employment within the
meaning of Title VII. 49
The fact that a pension plan appears racially neutral on its face does
not preclude the possibility that it violates Title VII. Proof of racially
disproportionate impact alone may be sufficient to establish a viola-
tion of Title VII regardless of the good faith intentions of the
employer. This fundamental proposition was firmly established in
Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 50  In Griggs, the United States Supreme
Court held that hiring practices, neutral on their face, which exclude
a disproportionate number of blacks constitute a violation of Title VII
unless the employer can show a direct relationship between the prac-
tice and job performance. 51 The Griggs opinion stressed that Title
VII proscribes not only overt discrimination, but also practices that
are fair in form but discriminatory in operation. 52 It follows from
Griggs that a facially neutral pension plan could be held to violate
Title VII if it is shown to distribute materially fewer benefits to
minorities than to whites.
The emphasis in Title VII litigation on the impact of employment
policies has led to heavy reliance on statistical evidence 53 to identify
under-representation of minorities in an employer's work force 54 and
thereby establish a prima facie case. 55 Use of statistical evidence to
reveal an under-representation of minorities among retirees receiving
retirement benefits could be equally effective.
The life expectancy figures presented earlier in this Article could
be offered as statistical proof that a particular pension plan is dis-
criminatory. However, because they pertain to the general popula-
tion, rather than a distinct workforce, their relevance is arguably lim-
ited. Ideally, a study of the present and past work force of larger
49. EEOC v. Colby College, 15 FEP 1363, 1365 n.2 (D. Me. 1977); Chastang v. Flynn &
Emrich Co., 541 F.2d 1040 (4th Cir. 1976); Peters v. Missouri-Pacific R.R., 483 F.2d 490 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1002 (1973); Rosen v. Public Service Electric & Gas Co., 477 F.2d
90 (3rd Cir. 1973); Bartmess v. Drewrys U.S.A., Inc., 444 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 939 (1971).
50. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
51. Job relatedness or test "validity" is the key criterion in ascertaining the legality of tests
that are preconditions of employment. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1607.2, 1607.5(A) (1976).
52. 401 U.S. at 431.
53. See Note, Beyond the Prima Facie Case in Employment Discrimination Law: Statistical
Proof and Rebuttal, 89 HARv. L. REV. 387 (1975).
54 See, e.g., Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1974).
55. See note 35 stopra.
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employers should be made to ascertain life expectancies for whites
and minority persons who are directly affected by a particular type of
pension plan.
Certain difficulties, however, limit the availability or uefulness of
such data. Years of racial and ethnic discrimination in virtually every
major industry have radically limited employment opportunities for
non-whites. 56 While changing attitudes and successful litigation have
resulted in substantial gains, the progress is too recent to allow any
significant analysis of death rates and life expectancies for minority
workers. It is essential, therefore, that general population figures be
accepted as the only figures extant and that reliance be placed upon
them. Otherwise, whole industries would be rewarded for their past
discriminatory practices.
The propriety of relying on general population statistics in indi-
vidual cases or class actions is supported by Griggs and its progeny.
In Griggs, the Court considered statistics regarding the limited
educational opportunities for blacks as a whole to be relevant in de-
termining the legitimacy of the hiring and transfer standards of one
particular company. 57 A subsequent Ninth Circuit decision 58 invali-
dated an employer's policy of rejecting job applicants who had an
arrest record, on the basis that blacks were statistically more likely to
have arrest records. For similar reasons, a policy that resulted in the
automatic discharge of an employee whose wages were garnished was
held to be a violation of Title VII by the Eighth Circuit. 59 Life ex-
pectancy is as clearly affected by socioeconomic and educational fac-
tors 60 as the ability to pass standard intelligence tests, the likelihood
of an arrest record, and the likelihood of wage garnishment. 61 In
each context, there is a confluence of societal factors and employment
practices that result in unlawful discriminatory impact.
Allegedly discriminatory disability benefit and pension plans have
been the subject of three recent notable cases, General Electric Co.
v. Gilbert,62 EEOC v. Colby College,63 and Manhart v. City of Los
56. W. GOULD, BLACK WORKERS IN WHITE UNIONS (1977).
57. 401 U.S. 430 (1971).
58. Gregory v. Litton Systems, Inc., 472 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972).
59. Wallace v. Debren, 494 F.2d 674 (8th Cir. 1974).
60. These and other factors as they affect minority workers are discussed in N. GLAZER &
D. MOYNIHAN, ETHNICITY 11-15 (1975); H. GUTMAN, WORK, CULTURE & SOCIETY IN IN-
DUSTRIALIZING AMERICA (1975).
61. While "job relatedness" was a key factor in Griggs, Gregory and Wallace, the concept
has no bearing on the retirement benefits issue.
62. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
63. 15 FEP 1363 (D. Me. 1977).
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Angeles. 64 The pattern that emerges from these cases, all of which
involve charges of sex discrimination in violation of Title VII, is not
an entirely consistent one. Yet it provides no basis for rejecting the
proposition" that racially discriminatory retirement plans violate Title
VII.
General Electric Co. v. Gilbert 65 involved a charge by several
women employees that the company's disability plan violated Title
VII's prohibition of sex discrimination by excluding from coverage all
disabilities resulting from pregnancy. Obviously only women were
affected by that exclusion, yet the Court found no violation of Title
VII.6 6 The Court was swayed by the fact that men were not
explicitly treated favorably and did not receive a disproportionate
share of disability benefits. 67 Rather, it was shown only that certain
risks were selected for inclusion in the plan and that certain other
risks were excluded. 68 Said Justice Rehnquist, "we start from the
indisputable baseline that 'the fiscal and actuarial benefits of the pro-
gram . . . accrue to members of both sexes.' "69 Because there was
no proof that the package was in fact worth more to men than to
women, the Court felt it impossible to find any gender-based dis-
criminatory effect in the scheme. 70
The principle to be extracted from Gilbert then is that a violation
of Title VII may be established if it can be shown that a benefit plan
operates to the substantial detriment of a protected class. In other
words, had it been shown in Gilbert that because of the pregnancy
exclusion the plan paid out 170% more in benefits for men than for
women, a gender-based discriminatory effect would likely have been
established.
Such a showing can be made in the context of retirement plans
where whites receive more than minority persons. For example, a
showing that such a plan pays out $1.50 for every white and only
$1.00 for every black establishes a race-biased discriminatory effect.
Such statistics would be particularly persuasive if a retirement plan
involves contributions from employees, since the cost is then carried
by the individual minority person as well as the company.
64. 13 FEP 1625 (9th Cir. 1976), rehearing denied, 553 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1977).
65. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
66. In so doing, the Court carefully followed the reasoning of Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S.
484 (1974), in which a challenge brought under the Equal Protection Clause to a similar disabil-
ity exclusion was rejected.
67. In Gilbert, the defendant introduced evidence indicating that the plan paid 170% more
for females than for males even with the pregnancy exclusion. 429 U.S. at 131 n.10.





Another reason for the decision in Gilbert stemmed from a conflict
in opinion between the EEOC and the Department of Labor as to
the legality of plans that differentiate between men and women.
While the EEOC opined in its guidelines that unequal benefits of
this nature violate Title VII, 71 the Wage and Hour Division of the
Department of Labor stated in its regulations that they did not violate
the Equal Pay Act. 72 The United States Supreme Court in Gilbert
stated that, because of Section 703(h) of Title VII, 73 the regulation
enacted under the Equal Pay Act was controlling. 74
Soon after the Gilbert decision, a federal district court in Maine
was faced with determining the propriety of a pension and annuity
plan administered by Colby College which treated men and women
differently. 75 Under the plan in question, males and females made
equal contributions into the plan. Employer contributions were made
on an equal basis as well. Female annuitants, however, received
lower monthly payments than did men because women in the plan
were shown to live longer than men. Conversely, dependents of
males received lower death benefits than did dependents of
females. 76
Relying on Gilbert, the Colby court found no violation of Title
VII. 77  As in Gilbert, the court held that the Department of Labor's
regulation stating that such plans constitute no violation of the Equal
Pay Act is controlling. In addition, the Colby court deemed it highly
significant that the operation of the plans was based on the "essential
71. The Commission issued guidelines on sex discrimination in 1972. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.9(0
(1976) states in pertinent part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to have a pension or
retirement plan which establishes different optional or compulsory retirement age
based on sex, or which differentiates in benefits on the basis of sex.
72. The Wage and Hour Administrator issued a regulation, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.9(0 (1976),
which states in pertinent part:
If employer contributions to a plan providing insurance or similar benefits to
employees are equal for both men and women, no wage differential prohibited by
the equal pay provisions will result from such payments, even though the benefits
which accrue to the employees in question are greater for one sex than for the
other.
73. 42. U.S.C. § 2 000e 2(h) (1970), also known as the Bennett Amendment, provides in
pertinent part:
It shall not be an unlawful employment practice under this subchapter for any
employer to differentiate upon the basis of sex in determining the amount of the
wages or compensation paid or to be paid to employees of such employer if such
differentiation is authorized by the provisions of Section 206(d) of Title 29 (the
Equal Pay Act).
74. 429 U.S. at 136-37.
75. EEOC v. Colby College, 15 FEP 1363 (D. Me. 1977).




proposition" that neither the annuity nor the death benefit funds be
depleted before all covered annuitants die. 78
The facts of Colby .,are closely analogous to the situation dealt with
in this Article-i.e. pension plans, public and private-that are
neutral on their face but which give rise to a racially discriminatory
impact. However, the Colby finding of no Title VII violation should
not preclude a Title VII challenge to pension plans that discriminate
against minority elders on the basis of race. In the latter situation,
there would be no conflict between an Equal Pay Act regulation and
a Title VII guideline because there would be no allegations of sex
discrimination. Additionally, neither Colby nor Gilbert involved evi-
dence of unequal receipt of benefits by men and women. 79  In the
minority elder context, however, it would be possible to offer statisti-
cal proof that, although the plans are not facially discriminatory in
their contribution requirements, their benefits do not accrue equally
to minorities and whites. Moreover, no adjustments are made to
achieve or even approach the equal receipt of benefits.
A variation on Gilbert and Colby was considered by the Ninth Cir-
cuit in Manhart v. City of Los Angeles. 80 Relying on actuarial tables
which indicated that women live substantially longer than men, a
city-operated pension plan required women employees to contribute
fifteen per cent more into the pension plan than similarly situated
men. The court held that the plan violated Title VII because the
differential treatment was based on sex rather than longevity as
claimed by the city defendant. The policy failed to treat female
employees as individuals and based its contribution schedule on
membership in a minority group. To require larger contributions
from women because they "'on the average' live longer than men is
just the kind of abstract generalization ... which Title VII was de-
signed to abolish." 81 The court held, in essence, that because the
City of Los Angeles could not predict which women would live
longer, unequal contributions were unlawful.
At first glance, the Manhart situation differs from the minority
elder problem. In Manhart, women were required to contribute
78. id.
79. Note that even with the pregnancy exclusion in Gilbert, women received no less than
did men under the disability plan.
80. 13 FEP 1625 (9th Cir. 1976), rehearing denied, 553 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1977). A rehear-
ing had been sought in light of the Supreme Court's decision in General Electric Company v.
Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
81. 13 FEP 1628. As a general matter, overgeneralizations that detrimentally affect pro-
tected individuals are suspect. E.g. Rosen v. Public Service Electric & Gas Co., 477 F.2d 90
(3rd Cir. 1973); Schaefer v. San Diego Yellow Cabs, Inc., 462 F.2d 1002 (9th Cir. 1972).
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more to the fund to receive equal benefits, whereas in the minority
elder context, minority elders contribute equally with Anglos but re-
ceive fewer benefits. In other words, the plan in Manhart appears to
be discrimiiatory on its face whereas the public and private pension
plans in question carefully avoid facial discrimination but do give rise
to a racially disproportionate impact. In fact, however, these plans are
discriminatory on their face if one considers that, on an actuarial
basis, blacks are paying into the system at a higher rate than Anglos
when the contribution rate is related to benefits received.
Manhart is consistent with the purpose of Title VII in that it strikes
down sex-based generalizations that operate to the detriment of a pro-
tected class 8 2 even when the generalizations are statistically based.
The Manhart court condemned the use of general "average" life ex-
pectancy tables to determine benefit plan contribution rates because
they fail to consider individuals and thereby operate to the detriment
of a protected class. Manhart is not inconsistent, however, with the
use of statistical averages as evidentiary proof of illegal discriminatory
impact against minorities in the operation of retirement plans. The
two approaches are not only consistent, but in fact they complement
one another.
In conclusion, Gilbert provides sound precedent for the result
urged here. In addition to conceptual support from Gilbert, Colby
gave specific support to the use of actuarial tables in the context of
Title VII and private pension plans.8 3
Other Bases for Challenging Retirement Plans
Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 186684 is a remedy against
private employers that is independent of Title VII. 85 It imposes
fewer procedural prerequisites to bringing an action in federal
court, 86 but the questions and standards of proof are similar to those
under Title VII. At the same time, it can provide a basis for relief
82. See also Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (1969), which invali-
dated a discriminatory hiring policy based on a belief that, on the average, women cannot do
heavy lifting and work long hours.
83. 14 FEP at 1237. Also, Judge Kilkenny in his dissenting opinion in Manhart II approved
of the use of actuarial tables to achieve equity in the distribution of benefits.
84. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970). See Larson, The Development of § 1981 as a Remedy for
Racial Discrimination in Private Employment, 7 HARV. Civ. RTS.-Civ. LiB. L. REv. 56 (1972).
85. See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 466 (1975).




that is more immediate8 7 and broader"" than that available under
Title VII.
Executive Orders 11,11489 and 11,24690 provide another avenue of
challenge to private plans. These orders prohibit racial discrimination
on the part of federal contractors. With enforcement lodged in the
Office of Federal Contract Compliance (OFCC), a non-complying
employer can face cancellation of its federal contracts.
Private plans might also be challenged as violations of the "duty of
fair representation." By statute, 91 some unions are held to a judicially
enforceable duty to exercise their powers on behalf of all those they
represent, without hostile discrimination. 92 This duty extends to all
union actions in the negotiation, administration and enforcement of
collective bargaining agreements. 93 It includes direct action by the
union and discriminatory actions by an employer that are caused, in-
fluenced or unchallenged by the union.94
Courts have found breaches of this duty of fair representation
where unions used their influence to discharge black employees who
were in a different union, 95 prevented the advancement of black
workers into certain fields, 96 and failed to pursue all necessary pro-
cedural steps to enforce and protect the rights of an aggrieved
employee. 97  Failure to seek and obtain equitable retirement benefits
for minority employees may also constitute a breach of duty of fair
87. Most courts require the satisfaction of numerous filing and notice requirements before
they will issue emergency or preliminary relief under Title VII.
88. There are restrictions on the awarding of relief for periods prior to the enactment of
Title VII in 1965. Back pay, for example, may be ordered retroactively for a longer period of
time under Section 1981. See Brown v. Gaston County Dyeing Machine Co., 457 F.2d 1377
(5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 982 (1972).
89. Exec. Order No. 11,114, 28 Fed. Reg. 6845 (1963).
90. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319 (1965).
91. Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. § 141-197 (1970); Railway Labor
Act (RLA), 45 U.S.C. § 151-188 (1970).
92. Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 203 (1944). Steele was brought
under the RLA and was the first Supreme Court decision to uphold the duty and private cause
of action in a race discrimination context. These same concepts, although not always in race
discrimination cases were read into the LMRA in Vaca v. Sypes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); Hum-
phrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964); Syres v. Oil Workers Int'l, Local 23, 350 U.S. 892 (1956);
Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953). Jurisdiction in federal courts has been based
on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1337 and 1343 (1970).
93. Brady v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 401 F.2d 87, 94 (3rd Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 1048 (1969).
94. See, e.g., Dillard v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 199 F.2d 948, 951 (4th Cir. 1952).
95. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768 (1952).
96. Dillard, note 94, supra.
97. See Vaca v. Sypes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
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representation, particularly if the union in question is aware of racial
discrepancies in the receipt of benefits. 98
Section 302(c)(5) of the Taft-Hartley Act 99 is another possible basis
for challenging discriminatory retirement plans. This section requires
union trustees of pension funds to operate the fund for the "sole and
exclusive benefit" of all of its beneficiaries. Accordingly, eligibility
standards and other policies that tend to limit the rights of or dis-
criminate against minority persons may constitute a violation of Sec-
tion 302(c)(5). 100
Once identified, discrepancies in the distribution of benefits may
be so large as to stimulate litigation under any or all of these ap-
proaches. The wiser, more compatible and less costly approach is to
alter eligibility requirements and/or levels of payments to minority
persons before litigation becomes necessary. While this may demand
modification of collective bargaining agreements in some cases, such
modification is the duty of both management and unions to minority
workers.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REMEDIAL ACTION
The discriminatory distribution and under-utilization of public and
private benefits must be remedied to help alleviate the economic
plight of many minority elders. It is sometimes asserted that
economic and related hardships encountered by members of minority
groups-particularly Asian and Mexican-Americans-are ameliorated
by filial piety or the attention and support received from adult chil-
dren.101 Unfortunately, filial piety is increasingly a victim of a cul-
98. See Martinez v. Ivers, No. C-75-6198 RHS (N.D.Cal.). This class action was filed on
behalf of retired seasonal cannery workers, the vast majority of whom are of minority
background. Named plaintiffs allege, in essence, that a pension trust fund managed and main-
tained by the Western Conference of Teamsters operates primarily for the benefit of truck
drivers, or "long term" employees, most of whom are Anglos. It alleges that short term workers
who are disproportionately minorities receive virtually no benefits. It cannot be disputed that
short term or seasonal cannery workers are and have traditionally been Mexican-Americans and
women.
Martinez alleges a breach of fiduciary duty under Section 302(c)(5) of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29
U.S.C. § 186(c)(5) (1970), and a breach of the duty owed union members of fair representation.
It seeks damages and modification of all pension fund provisions that interfere with the ability of
minorities to qualify for their fair share of benefits.
99. 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5) (1970).
100. See Martinez v. Ivers, note 98, supra. The plaintiffs in Martinez base one cause of
action on this provision.
101. The Special Concerns Session on the Asian-American Elderly decried the myth that the
"Asian-American aged do not have any problems, that the Asian-Americans are able to take care
of their own, and that Asian-Americans do not need or desire aid in any form." The session
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ture and a value system that are, at best, inhospitable. Extensive
migration to urban environs, non-traditional education in white-oper-
ated school systems, and economic hardship that limits the ability of
an extended family to live together are all factors contributing to its
erosion.
Because so many minority elders have virtually nowhere else to
turn for economic support, the courts, Congress, employers, unions
and the legal community each must take responsibility for ensuring
that minority eldes receive their fair share of retirement benefits.
The United States Supreme Court has stated that courts "have not
merely the power, but the duty to render a decree which will so far
as possible eliminate the discriminatory effects of the past as well as
bar like discrimination in the future.' 02 In exercising this power,
some courts have modified collective bargaining agreements.
10 3
Modification of payment schedules or age eligibilities of pension or
retirement plans certainly goes no further. An appropriate remedy
might take a monetary form in an effort to make whole the minority
persons. Difficulties inherent in ascertaining an award prospectively,
which would be necessary on a class basis to achieve equitable ad-
justment of retirement benefits, can be overcome by a coordinated
actuarial and economic analysis.
Private employers must ensure that contributions by or for minor-
ities accrue to the benefit of those minorities rather than support or
subsidize payments made to white workers. The problem might be
solved by giving minority workers an option to retire early with full
benefits. Although minority workers cannot be compelled to accept
and may well reject an option for earlier retirement, this proposal
presents the most direct method of obtaining benefits for the millions
of minority workers whose life expectancy is less than sixty-five years.
report pointed out that the suicide rate among Asian-American elders in some areas is triple the
national average and that a disproportionate number of elderly Asians were in mental institu-
tions. See Kii, Status Changes of Japanese Elderly in the Legal Family, and Economic Institu-
tions (1976) (unpublished).
Similar patterns emerge in the Mexican-American population, particularly in rural areas
where patriarchal family structures are traditionally strongest. See Leonard, The Older Rural
Spanish-Speaking People of the Southwest in YOUMANS, OLDER RURAL AMERICANS, at 251
(1971).
At the same time, Torres-Gil and others report the survival of traditional family ties in many
instances notwithstanding the divers impeding factors. F. Torres-Gil, supra note 28, at 7.
102. Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 154 (1965).
In addition to possible remedies delineated in the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(g), the 1972 amendment to that provision enables a court to order "any other equitable
relief as the court deems appropriate."
103. See, e.g., Rios v. Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters, '501 F.2d 622, 631 (2nd Cir. 1974);
NAACP v. Allen, 493 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974).
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Also, increasing monthly benefits for minority persons who have
reached retirement age but who have a shorter life expectancy than
white workers could be effective. Given reliable actuarial information
and/or government figures, this can be done consistently with de-
veloping case law. Alternatively or in addition, minority workers
could receive payments from the appropriate retirement fund as a
supplement to their wages or salaries as they grow older.
Other alternatives appear less attractive. Increasing payments for
whites or decreasing them for minorities would result in facially dis-
criminatory contributions and might be susceptible to a challenge
based on Manhart. Decreasing benefits for whites is politically un-
feasible and the creation of a separate retirement fund for minority
employees would be both unnecessary and burdensome.
Unions have a responsibility at least as great as that of employers.
Unions should endeavor to modify the terms of pension plans-both
unilaterally and through collective bargaining procedures-to elimi-
nate the unconscionable inequities that have been identified in this
Article.
The United States Congress also must take remedial steps. It re-
cently enacted major legislation primarily designed to shore up the
failing economic base of the Social Security system, 10 4 but included
no provisions which address the problems raised here. Nevertheless,
congressional action does present the most reasonable approach.
In 1961, the Social Security Act was amended to lower the eligibil-
ity age of male workers to age sixty-two from age sixty-five. 10 5 This
helped to alleviate the hardships faced by those men who, because of
ill health, automation, or other technological changes, are forced into
premature retirement before age sixty-five. More help is needed,
however, for those workers in depressed areas where economic forces
beyond their control lower their actual retirement age to under
sixty-five, 10 6 and for minority elders who face the total loss of benefits
because of premature death.
Support for this proposition came from the 1971 White House
Conference on Aging, which recognized that functional rather than
chronological aging concepts must be utilized. The Special Needs
Session on Elderly Blacks called for an eight-year reduction of age
104. Social Security Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-216, 91 Stat. 1509 (1977).
105. 42 U.S.C. § 402(a) (1970); 20 C.F.R. § 404.303 (1977). Note again that eligibility at age
62 is only available to those'who affirmatively choose it. A small minority opt for lower benefits
at age 62.




eligibility for blacks under Social Security. 10 7 A sister report called
for lowering eligibility to age fifty-five for Spanish-speaking elders in
urban areas 108 and to age forty-five for the Spanish-speaking who
were rural farmworkers. 10 9
The need for remedial action of this nature cannot be more clear.
Life expectancy rates for minority persons are not undergoing ap-
preciable increases. The manifest inequalities in the Social Security
system will not materially change unless amending legislation modi-
fies eligibility and benefit computation provisions.
The legal community must also take responsibility. Traditional legal
services programs have failed to provide adequate legal services to
the elderly poor. A 1969 study conducted by the Office of Economic
Opportunity revealed that elders constituted some twenty per cent of
the nation's poor but accounted for only about six per cent of the
clientele of those programs studied. The result of this study has
spurred the formation in recent years of a system of legal services for
elders. 110 There are now well over 150 such programs, mostly
funded under the Older Americans Act of 1965.111 While our na-
tion's elders as a whole are now surely receiving more effective serv-
ices, it is questionable whether minority elders are benefiting to the
same extent as whites.
The special and sometimes unique legal needs of minority elders
cannot be met unless services are expanded and adapted to cultural
differences. Providers of legal services must be appropriately bilingual
and bicultural. Services must be available in minority communities
and information about legal rights must be disseminated in all repre-
sented languages. Perhaps most importantly, lawyers and legal work-
ers who themselves have a minority background must become more
involved in the provision of legal and advocacy services to minority
elders.
The scope of legal services must also be broader than is typically
the case. It must include a vigorous educational component in order
to increase awareness among minority and service communities of the
special needs and problems of minority elders. For example, because
many minority elders are unsure or mistaken about their immigrant
status, such information must be dispersed as widely as possible.
107. 1971 WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE ON AGING, ADMINISTRATION ON AGING, U.S. DEP'T
OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL NEEDS SESSION ON EL-
DERLY BLACKS 9 (1971).
108 Id. at 5.
109. Id.
110. See Nathanson, Legal Services for the Nation's Elderly, 17 ARIZ. L. REV. 275 (1975).
111. 42 U.S.C. § 3001 (1970).
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CONCLUSION
Minority persons in this nation face numerous and severe diflicul-
ties, most of which are rooted in racial discrimination and education-
ally limited backgrounds. Similarly, elders encounter a broad range of
problems that are more a function of age than of any other identifi-
able factor.
This Article has shown that the combination of elder and minority
status has a compounding effect on such fundamental issues as
economic security and the delivery of basic health care. It has iden-
tified certain policies in both the private and public sectors that de-
mand remedial attention. It is, above all, a stimulus to the movement
to provide improved and more equitable support to America's ever
growing elder population.

